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Abstract
This paper analyzes the Spanish monetary system from 1856, when the Bank of Spain 
was created, to 1874, when it was awarded the monopoly of emission. This period was 
characterized by the emergence of an unregulated banking system, with multiple banks of 
issue entitled to emit bank notes. We focus on two main issues: i) the large fl uctuations in 
the money supply during this period; and ii) the lack of a lender of last resort in the banking 
panic of 1866. To analyze this, we construct a new dataset on money supply aggregates. 
The paper also estimates the economic impact of monetary fl uctuations with the help of 
a calibrated new Keynesian model. Our results suggest that money supply shocks had a 
milder effect on infl ation and output than the one predicted by the theory.
Keywords: unregulated banking, Gresham’s`law, lender of last resort, Overend and Gurney 
crisis.
JEL classifi cation: N13, N23, E31, E5.
Resumen
Este trabajo analiza el sistema monetario español desde 1856, fecha de la creación del 
Banco de España, hasta 1874, cuando este recibe el monopolio de emisión de billetes. El 
trabajo analiza dos aspectos fundamentales: i) el funcionamiento de un sistema monetario 
con múltiples bancos de emisión y sin un «prestamista de última instancia»; y ii) el papel 
jugado por las grandes fl uctuaciones en la oferta monetaria sobre la crisis española de 
1864-1866. Tras haber descrito la situación histórica en ese periodo, se presenta una 
nueva base de datos con información acerca de la oferta monetaria y sus componentes 
para este periodo. Dicha base de datos se emplea para comparar la evolución de las 
principales series económicas con las predicciones de un modelo Keynesiano de equilibrio 
general capaz de replicar la evolución de la cantidad de dinero. Los resultados indican 
que las fl uctuaciones en la oferta monetaria tuvieron un menor efecto sobre la infl ación y el 
producto agregado de lo predicho por el modelo.
Palabras clave: Overend y Gurney, oferta monetaria, crisis fi nanciera, Banco de España, 
Bimetalismo.
Códigos JEL: N13, N23, E31, E5.
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1 Introduction
We analyze the Spanish monetary system from 1856, when the Bank of Spain was ‘cre-
ated’, to 1874, when it was awarded the monopoly of emission. This period was charac-
terized by the coexistence of the Bank of Spain and other local banks of issue in a system
of fractional-reserve banking. In this paper we describe the origins and operation of such
a system. In particular, we focus on two issues: i) the lack of a lender of last resort due
to the atomization of the system, which had dramatic consequences during the banking
panic of 1866; ii) the role of the large fluctuations in the money supply in the Spanish
crisis of the years 1864-1866.
The ‘creation’ of the Bank of Spain in 1856 was not the first attempt to introduce a
bank of issue in Spain. The first bank of issue had been the Bank of San Carlos, renamed
in 1829 as Banco de San Fernando. In the early 1850s, Spain experienced a shortage in
the money supply and the Bank of San Fernando was constantly at its maximum legal
emission volume of banknotes. At this time, a debate emerged on the way to increase the
money supply. The response of the Government was to introduce, together with other
liberal laws, the Law of Banks of Issue, which broke the monopoly of emission of the Bank
of San Fernando, renamed as the Bank of Spain, by creating a system of multiple banks
of issue. New banks had the monopoly of emission in their cities, while the Bank of Spain
had the monopoly of emission in Madrid and in any place where no bank of issue was
to be created. Thus, the Bank of Spain was created not as the sole bank of issue in the
country, but as primus inter pares.
This arrangement had many similarities with free banking systems, such as those of
Scotland or the United States in the 19th century. Any entrepreneur was free to open a
new bank of issue in any Spanish city where there were no existing issuer or a branch
of the Bank of Spain. These local banks were free to issue their own banknotes, to
accept deposits, and to reject banknotes from other issuers. However, the system was not
completely unregulated as the maximum volume of emission was limited to three times
the capital and the amount of metallic reserves.
Together with the Law of Banks of Issue, the Government introduced other liberal
laws in the period 1854-1856. In particular, the Railroads Law provided state aid for
the construction of new railways lines, and the Joint Stock Banks Law defined the con-
ditions for the establishment of investment banks similar to the recently created Crédit
Mobilier in France. The new laws encouraged the increase of credit, money supply and
economic activity, especially in the railways sector. Due to these laws, the Spanish econ-
omy experienced a sustained period of growth and development from 1856 to 1864. The
international environment also supported the economic expansion of these years due to
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the large expansion in the world money supply following discoveries of new gold deposits
in California, Australia and Russia.
The limitations of the particular banking system in Spain became apparent during
the international crisis of 1864-1866. The absence of a lender of last resort and the local
structure of the system of banks of issue reduced the capabilities of any single bank to
cope with the credit crunch, especially after the banking panic of May 1866 that followed
the bankruptcy of the English stock-bank Overend, Gurney and Co.1 The fiscal position
of the Government severely constrained the conduct of monetary policy by the Bank of
Spain. At the same time, the small size of the local banks of issue forced them to reduce
the amount of banknotes in a more conservative way than the Bank of Spain, in order to
limit the risks of a bank-run on banknotes. The consequence of the crisis was a collapse in
the Spanish banking system that took several years to repair. This period of deleveraging
and reconstruction came to an end in 1874, when the Government decided to award the
Bank of Spain the monopoly of emission in the whole country, giving the rest of banks of
issue the possibility of either to merge with the Bank or to operate solely as commercial
banks.
To analyze the evolution of monetary aggregates during the period, we construct a
database with information about the volume of metallic coins, banknotes and current ac-
counts. The database is constructed by collecting dispersed information about net inflows
and outflows of money from a variety of sources.2 Our results indicate that most of the
Spanish monetary base was composed of metal coins: on average, the volume of coins was
15 times larger than the volume of banknotes. This is evidence of the underdevelopment
of the Spanish financial system at the time. In addition, we document the severe contrac-
tion in the money supply during the period 1856-1866 and its progressive recovery from
1868 to 1873. This contraction was the consequence of both the international crisis and
the ‘Gresham’s Law’. The monetary imbalances due to the American Civil War induced
a flow of silver towards Eastern countries. Spain had at the time a bimetallic system
where the mint ratio between gold and silver was higher than the market ratio. In these
conditions, large amounts of silver were drained from Spain, implying a decline in the
money supply.
In addition to describing the historical context, this paper attempts to quantify the
impact of the fluctuations in the money supply in the observed evolution of output and
1The lack of a lender of last resort was common in European economies at the time, with the exception
of England. See below for details.
2In contrast to previous studies, such as Martin-Aceña and Pons (2005), which compute the amount
of gold and silver taken data from the mint, we analyze inflows and outflows of specie. The reason is
that, due to the large capital and trade flows during the period, only employing coinage information may
misrepresent the real amount of specie within the country.
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prices. To this end, we calibrate a standard new Keynesian model as in Gali (2009) and
Woodford (2003). This microfounded general equilibrium model extends the traditional
Keynesian IS-LM analysis with a forward-looking Phillips curve, and thus allows to ana-
lyze the effects of changes in the money supply on nominal and real variables. We assume
that the money supply is characterized by an exogenous stochastic process that replicates
the values in the data. Then, we compare the counterfactual evolution of output, inflation
and interest rates with that in the data. We find that, in the model, the drop in the money
supply from 1860 to 1866 implies large deflationary effects, which produce a fall of around
30 percent in output and around 10 percent in inflation. This prediction is in contrast
with the historical data, in which output and inflation were roughly constant during the
same period. Also, the effect of the recovery of money growth after 1867 on output and
inflation is delayed in the data with respect to the model. These results indicate that the
severe contraction in the money supply had a milder effect on the economy than the one
predicted in the new Keynesian framework.
This paper is related to two different strands of the literature. In the first place,
it relates to previous studies of the Spanish economy in the 1856-1874 period, such
as Fernández-Pulgar and Anes-Álvarez (1970), Martín-Aceña (2000), Sánchez-Albornoz
(1966), Sánchez-Ballesta and Bernal (2010), Sardà (1998), Sudrià (1994), Tedde (1999,
2004, 2006) and Tortella (1969, 1973). We complement this literature by focusing on the
monetary aspects and international linkages of the boom and the bust. In the second
place, this paper relates to the growing literature that employs dynamic stochastic gen-
eral equilibrium (DSGE) models to analyze economic events before Bretton Woods. Most
of these works, including Bordo et al. (1995, 2000), Christiano et al. (2003), Cole and
Ohanian (1999) and Kehoe and Prescott (2002), focus on the Great Depression.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we describe the Spanish financial
system in 1856. In section 3, we analyze the boom and bust cycle of the Spanish economy
in the period 1856-1874, with a focus on the international crisis of 1864-1866 and its
effects on the Spanish economy. In section 4, we introduce the dataset and discuss the
evolution of money supply and its impact on output and prices in the context of the new
Keynesian model. Finally, in section 5, we conclude.
2 The Spanish Financial System in 1856
2.1 The Ancestors of the Bank of Spain
The Bank of Spain was ‘created’ on 28th January 1856. It was not, however, the first
attempt to establish a central bank in Spain. In fact, the first bank of issue was the Bank
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of San Carlos, which was introduced in the country during the kingdom of Carlos III. It
was inspired by the ideas of the Enlightenment and followed the example of the Bank of
England and the Sveriges Riksbank. The aim of the Bank was to help the Treasury to
raise funds. Unfortunately, the increase in public deficit and the fall in revenues from the
American colonies due to the continuous wars with the Revolutionary France (1793-1795),
Great Britain (1796-1802 and 1804-1808) and Napoleonic France (1808-1814), depressed
the value of public debt and the solvency of the Bank. Finally, in 1829, it was closed and
renamed as Bank of San Fernando.
The Bank of San Fernando, as it predecessor, had the monopoly of issue in the city
of Madrid, which at the time was the only place where banknotes were accepted. It also
discounted trade bills and provided short-term loans to the Treasury. The Bank was a key
factor of the victory of the liberal faction that supported future Queen Isabel II during
the Spanish Civil War (Primera Guerra Carlista, 1833-1840).3 The end of the war was
followed by an intense economic boom. The Bank of San Fernando was then accused of
abusing of its monopoly of issue to obtain large profits by rationing credit and hence two
new banks of issue were created in 1844: the Bank of Barcelona, in Barcelona, and the
Bank of Isabel II, also in Madrid. In 1846, a fourth bank was created in the Southern
city of Cadiz.
The Bank of Isabel II was controlled by a new generation of liberal entrepreneurs, such
as José Salamanca, with strong links to the Government. In contrast with the Bank of
San Fernando, which directed most of its credit to the Government, the Bank of Isabel II
financed some private projects, such as the railway line Madrid-Aranjuez, and provided
funds to speculate in stock markets. These loans were typically guaranteed by stocks and
the borrowers were often members of the Governing Council of the Bank, especially José
Salamanca. When the European economic crisis began in 1847, it was clear that most of
the credits of the Bank of Isabel II would not be recovered. To avoid bankruptcy, José
Salamanca himself became Finance Minister and leaded the merge of the Bank of Isabel
II with the more conservative (and healthier) Bank of San Fernando in a new institution,
which retained the name of Bank of San Fernando.
During the period 1849-1854, the working of the Bank was reorganized by a couple
of laws, one in 1849 and the other 1851. The capital of the Bank was set to 30 million
pesetas, and the maximum volume of banknotes was limited to the same amount as the
capital. The maximum ratio of banknotes over metallic reserves was set to three and no
lending was permitted if the collateral were stocks of the Bank. During this period the
new Governor of the Bank, Ramón Santillán, redirected most of the profits to mitigate
3Tedde (2006) estimates that the Bank provided 8 percent of the war costs.
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the consequences of bad loans in the Bank balance-sheet.4 The other two banks of issue,
those of Barcelona and Cadiz, had a paid-up capital of 1.2 and 2 million pesetas and
circulating banknotes with a total value of 2.4 and 2.7 millions, respectively.
2.2 The 1854-1856 Liberal Laws
The Bank of Spain was ‘created’ in the period 1854-1856, when a new liberal Government,
leaded by Baldomero Espartero, began the discussion in the Parliament of a series of new
laws aimed at modernizing the Spanish economy. These laws had a profound impact
on the evolution of the Spanish economy in the next two decades. Spain had at the
time a predominant agrarian economy that kept more than 63 per cent of labor force
predominantly occupied in subsistence production of wheat and other grain crops. The
only exceptions were Catalonia, where there was a modern textile industry, and some cities
in the Southeast, Andalusia and the North, where there was an increasing mining activity
under the incentive of the foreign demand. Industrial working population accounted for
17 percent of the labor force and the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was equivalent to
73 per cent of the mean of that of the 15 European countries that later would form the
European Economic Community.56
The first of the laws, known as ‘Expropriation of Madoz’ (Desamortización General o
de Madoz), expropriated and auctioned the lands of the Catholic Church, the State and
the local governments. Some of the previous owners of these lands, like the Church and the
local councils, were compensated with public debt.7 The whole sale of public properties
represented nearly 1960 millions of pesetas, equivalent to one third of the Spanish Gross
Product of 1860. The original aim of the law was to obtain new funds to reduce the debt
burden of the country. Notwithstanding, after a new Government leaded by O’Donell took
office in 1858, most of the funds were redirected to expand the expenditures in defense
and infrastructures.
The second law was the ‘Railroads Law’ (Ley de Ferrocarriles). It provided state
aid and reduced the administrative burden for building railways lines in Spain, including
4Tedde (1999).
5Spanish total population increased, since 1820 to 1850, from 11.7 to 15.3 millions of inhabitants, which
implies a rate of growth of 0.9 per cent, higher than in the rest of Southern Europe. See Perez-Moreda
(1985, pp. 25-61).
6See Carreras and Tafunell (2010). The countries were France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Nederland,
Luxembourg, Greece, Portugal, Finland, Sweden, United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark, Austria, and
Spain.
7The product of all these disposals was earned by the Treasury as extraordinary revenues during the
years that this process lasted. In fact, the complete sale of public and Church properties almost took
until the end of the century, due to magnitude of the transaction and because the majority of the buyers
paid the properties in installments, the payment of a single property normally lasting fifteen annuities.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 14 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1119
the possibility of foreign investment in the stock of the railways companies, the total
exemption of custom tariffs in the import of iron, machinery, wagons and other transport
equipment, and the public subsiding of, at most, the third part of the construction budget.
This law soon showed its effectiveness. Prior to 1855, only 440 kilometers had been
constructed in Spain; from 1856 to 1866, more of 4,300 kilometers were opened to the
traffic. Most of these lines, according to a radial scheme, went from Madrid to the French
and Portuguese borders, to Sevilla and Cadiz, in the South, to Santander in the North, and
to the main Mediterranean towns, like Barcelona or Valencia, in the East. Additionally,
other lines were constructed from the Basque Country to Catalonia. The total railway
investment in Spain amounted in 1867 to more than 2,760 millions of pesetas, jointly
in stock and debenture bonds; of this sum, about 45 per cent, that is, 1,241 millions of
pesetas corresponded to French investments.8
The third one, ‘Joint Stock Banks Law’ (Ley General de Sociedades de Crédito) defined
the conditions for the establishment of sociedades de crédito, that is, investment banks
similar to the recently created Crédit Mobilier in France and the English joint stock
banks. A joint stock bank was a new form of financial enterprise to furnish funds for
new enterprises upon pledge of its stock. For example, a proposed railway did not have
to await the slow process of placing its stock and bonds among investors, in order to
obtain funds to begin construction, but would deposit these securities in a joint stock
bank, which would agree to accept its debts for a specified sum. These joint stock banks
were able to sell their own shares and thus obtain the funds to make advances to the
railways companies. In addition, the principle of limited liability reduced the risks for
stockholders.
The arising of joint stock banks had happened in France in advance of England or
Spain. Under the encouragement of Napoleon III, the Pereire brothers created the Crédit
Mobilier in December 1852 with a capital of 60 million francs. During the late 1850s and
the 1860s, other joint stock banks appeared in France: the Crédit Industriel et Commercial
in 1859, the Crédit Lyonnais in 1863 and the Société Générale in 1864.9 These banks
pushed for legal reforms in England or Spain in order to open new branches in these
countries. In England, the Joint Stock Companies Act of 1856 introduced limited liability
in the United Kingdom and the general right of incorporation without a precedent act of
the Parliament. The right was consolidated in the Company Act of 1862, which enlarged
the scope of the legislation. In Spain, it was the Ley General de Sociedades de Crédito
8Notwithstanding, effective French capital inflows were smaller, about 796 millions of pesetas, due to
the fact that the debenture bonds were sold at a loss, thus providing a real profit of 6 per cent to the
investors. See Tedde (1978, pp. 29-46).
9Kindleberger,(1993, pp. 112-113)..
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that introduced this new form of banking.
The craze for the sociedades de crédito in Spain was quite similar to that in England
for the joint stock banks. The consequence of the Ley de Sociedades de Crédito was the
emergence of a great number of sociedades de crédito during the period 1856-1864 (Table
1). The largest among them were the Crédito Mobiliario Español, created by the Pereire
brothers, the Sociedad Española Mercantil e Industrial, owned by the Rothschild, and
the Compañía General de Crédito en España, which was property of a group of French
entrepreneurs leaded by Alfred Prost. All these three banks accounted for a capital of
162.5 millions of pesetas; the most prominent one was the Crédito Mobiliario Español,
with a capital of 114 millions of pesetas.
2.3 The 1856 Law of Banks of Issue (Ley de Bancos de Emisión)
The last of the liberal laws approved in 1856 concerned the establishment of new banks
of issue and the regulation of existing ones. The 1851 legislation had strongly limited
the maximum emission volume to the bank capital, with deflationary consequences for
the economy. During the period 1851-1855, the Bank of San Fernando always kept a
volume of emission equal to the legal maximum, which implies that the Spanish economy
was demanding more liquidity than it was supplied.10 In this context, some of the most
prominent private bankers, typically also shareholders in the Bank of San Fernando, were
making pressure on the Government to pass a new law that allow the Bank to increase its
volume of banknotes. At the same time, a coalition of regional businessmen and foreign
bankers was asking to break the emission monopoly of the Bank, or at least to replicate it
at a smaller scale in other Spanish cities. The response of the Government was to begin
the discussion in the Parliament of a new law to improve the banking system.
During the last months of 1855, there was an intense debate at the Parliament between
proponents of a system with a single bank of issue, leaded by the Governor of the Bank of
San Fernando, Ramón Santillán, and those that argued for a pseudo-free-banking system
of multiple local monopolies. At the time, most European countries were moving toward
centralized systems. Nevertheless, the law finally broke the emission monopoly of the
Bank of San Fernando by creating a system with multiple banks of issue.
The first point of the law renamed the Bank of San Fernando as the Bank of Spain,
for a initial period of 25 years. It allowed the establishment of local banks of issue in
each Spanish city where there were no existing branches of the Bank of Spain. These new
banks had the monopoly of emission in their cities. The law also awarded the Bank of
Spain the emission monopoly in Madrid and in any place where no bank of issue was to
10Tortella (1970, p. 26).
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be created. With respect to the emission volume, the law entitled new and old banks of
issue to emit banknotes in a volume of less than three times the amount of their metallic
reserves, as in the 1851 law. The novelty was that the volume of banknotes was now
limited by three times the amount of the initial capital, that is, a threefold expansion
from the existing situation. Finally, the Government was responsible for the appointment
of the Governor of the Bank of Spain and of the rest of the banks of issue.
As a consequence of this law, the Bank of Spain was created not as the sole bank of
issue in the country, but as primus inter pares. This particular institutional design had
important implications in the next decade, as discussed in section 3.
3 The Evolution of the Financial System 1856-1874
3.1 The Boom Years 1856-1863
In the period 1856 the Spanish economy experienced a sustained period of growth and
development. The new laws encouraged the increase of credit, money supply and economic
activity. Joint stock banks channeled funds from investors to industrial projects, mainly
railroads and, to a minor extent, mining. Through them, foreign capital entered Spain
in an unprecedented volume since the times of the American colonies. As in the case of
England, the emergence of the sociedades de crédito increased the volume of credit in the
Spanish economy. It is estimated that more than 600 million reales of foreign capital were
invested in sociedades de crédito, roughly 60 per cent of their total capital. The effect was
to direct huge volumes of capital towards the railroad sector. As shown in Table 2, most
of the capital invested in stock companies during the period 1859-1866 went to railroad
companies. It was followed by investment in sociedades de crédito, which was typically
reinvested in railroads. The manufacturing sector received only a tiny part of the funds.
In 1864, for example, only 98 million pesetas out of 1000 were invested in manufacturing
(textile, mining, steel, etc.).
From 1856 to 1864 eleven banks of issue were opened in some of the more market-
oriented towns, like the earlier Barcelona and Cadiz banks: Bilbao, Sevilla, Santander,
Malaga, Jerez, Zaragoza, among others. Their aggregate paid-up capital in 1864 was 36.5
millions of pesetas, compared to 40.6 millions of pesetas of the Bank of Spain. Before
1874, the Bank of Spain only realized the opportunity of opening local branches in two
places, Valencia and Alicante, both on the Mediterranean coast.11 The law of banks of
issue was successful in its attempt to increase the circulation of banknotes in Spain, which
grew steadily from 1856 to 1863. The aggregate emission volume never reached its limit:
11Tedde, (2006, pp. 88-89).
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the ratio of banknotes over metallic reserves was always below the legal maximum of
three, a distinct feature with respect to the period pre-1856.
During this period, the Bank of Spain became more involved in the financing of the
Government. The various sovereign defaults of the previous decades had closed the access
to the international financial markets to the Spanish public debt. The consequence was
that the Spanish Government was in need of economic resources in order to finance its
program of public works such as road constructions and subsidies to the railways compa-
nies. For this reason, the Finance Minister, Pedro Salaverría, decided to issue a special
kind of public bonds, the Treasury bills (billetes del tesoro), for an amount of 400 millions
of pesetas, guaranteed by the properties expropriated in the desamortización; almost all
these bonds were purchased by the Bank of Spain. In 1864, Salaverría took the decision
of directly involving the Bank of Spain in the policy of sale of public properties. The sales
receipts of the public properties were delivered to the Bank, who had to accomplish their
collect. For its part, the Bank of Spain created a new asset, the Mortgage Bill (billete
hipotecario), with an interest of 6 per cent, which was backed by those receipts. The
whole amount obtained in the placement of the Mortgage Bills had to be transferred by
the Bank to the Treasury. By involving the Bank of Spain, the Government expected to
sold these bills at higher prices due to the solvency of the Bank. On the side of the Bank,
the deal seemed sound and profitable due to the strong guarantee of the assets.
The international environment also supported the economic expansion of these years.
In the decade of the 1850s and early 1860s there was a large increase in the world money
supply caused by the increase in the gold production after 1848, when new deposits
were discovered in California, Australia and Russia. The gold flow came in Europe from
overseas to compensate European exports. The inflow of gold in Europe surged when, in
1861, the United States Government suspended specie payments, seeking to raise revenue
for the civil war effort without exhausting its reserves of gold and silver. This decision
had the effect of redirecting gold flows from California to Europe during the American
Civil War (1861-1865). Net gold exports from the United States were, in million dollars,
21 in 1862, 56 in 1863, 89 in 1864 and 51 in 1865.12
3.2 The Crisis 1864-1866
In the year 1864-1866 an international crisis affected most European countries. The roots
of the crisis are diverse.13 In many countries the emergence of joint stock banks had
12Conant (1896, p. 500).
13 Although there is little doubt that both the panics of January 1864 in France and May 1866 in
London were but two scenes of the same plot, some authors have often classified them as two distinct
crises. Notwithstanding, Hawtrey makes the point that the English crisis was not isolated but a sequel
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generated a tremendous expansion in money and credit in the late 1850s and early 1860s.14
When the American Civil War (1861-1865) produced the blockade of the Southern ports
and reduced the supply of cotton for European mills, the price of cotton rocketed. Cotton
prices increased fourfold from 1860 to 1864. Speculation in cotton, and to a minor extent
in railways, was fuelled by the increase in leverage possible thanks to the emergence of
joint stock banks.
The silver drain and trade deficits of European countries and the troubles in Euro-
pean politics caused by the Prussian hegemonic policy inspired by Bismarck, provoked
continuous fluctuations of the discount rates of the main European central banks. In the
United Kingdom, in late 1863, the discount rate of the Bank of England was raised from
4% in November to 8% in December.15 Other European banks followed the same line to
avoid running out of reserves. The Bank of France raised the discount rate to 8% and
purchased bullion, from January to November, to the amount of 221 million francs.
The cotton bubble could not be indefinitely sustained. The abrupt tightening of
monetary policy amid a climate of pessimistic expectations generated a financial crisis that
affected many banks and businesses and brought the speculative climate of the previous
years to a halt.
The scarcity of specie was a key question for many European countries that had at that
time large deficits in their balances of payments. In the case of Spain, the international
crisis produced a tremendous impact on its monetary and financial system. The reasons
why the collapse in money an credit was so massive in Spain should be traced back to the
institutional design of the Spanish monetary system. In the first place, the fiscal position
of the Government severely constrained the conduct of monetary policy by the Bank of
Spain. During the crisis, Government pressures prevented the Bank from selling part of
its portfolio in order to obtain additional liquidity. Therefore, the Bank of Spain was
forced both to drastically reduce the volume of banknotes and to raise interest rates from
6 to 9 percent.16 The Bank of Spain was in dire straits when the public required, in a
tumultuous way, the payment in specie of their bills, under the suspect that there was
an excessive engagement of the Bank with the Treasury, perceived to be at the edge of
insolvency.
to the continental crisis of 1864. See Hawtrey (1979, p. 177). See also Kindleberger and Aliber (2005,
p. 117) and Flandreau (1995). Secondary causes are mentioned in Foucaud (2006, p. 56) and in Cottrell
(1980).
14For example, deposits in London joint stock banks, increased from £43 millions in 1860 to £91 millions
in 1864, when the nominal capital of the new limited companies surpassed the £500 millions. See Juglar
(1967,p. 385).
15See Homer and Sylla, (1963 pp.208-209) and Clapham (1944, vol. II pp. 259-260)..
16Tortella (1973, pp. 254-262).
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In the second place, the local structure of the system of banks of issue reduced the
capabilities of any single bank to cope with the credit crunch. Whereas the Bank of
Spain represented half of the Spanish monetary system, the other half was a system of
20 local banks of issue. When the crisis began, the small size of these banks forced them
to reduce the amount of banknotes in a more conservative way than the Bank of Spain,
in order to reduce the risks of a bank-run on banknotes. The decision in 1865 of the
Spanish Government to instruct the trade courts to delay as much as possible all the
cases involving convertibility of banknotes into metallic only made matters worse. This
decision created a legal vacuum where convertibility was decided case by case by each of
the local banks of issue and the Bank of Spain.17 The consequence was the mistrust by
the public in the banknotes of many of the local banks.
Finally, the initial monetary shock was amplified through the value of the collateral of
the financial system. In this case, the collateral was mainly stocks in railroad companies.
Due to scarcity of specie, the sociedades de crédito and local banks of issue were forced
to sell their assets in order to get some liquidity. The problem was that the massive
selling of assets only depressed stock prices even further, thus reducing even more the
value of the banks’ assets and their solvency. Hence, the Spanish economy experienced
the consequences of a financial accelerator during the period 1864-1866.18
3.3 The 1866 Panic and the Road to a Single Bank of Issue
The international situation seemed to be back in control in 1865 and the Bank of England
was able to reduce the rate below 4% during the summer. But in 1866, another huge
shock disturbed the financial economy in Europe, especially in Great Britain, when the
prestigious bank Overend, Gurney & Co. suspended payments in May 1866 and went
into liquidation in June. This occurred amid a climate of pessimism due to the political
situation in Central Europe, where the Austro-Pussian War was about to begin.
Overend, Gurney & Co. was the resultant of the transformation of the one of City
oldest and more prestigious firms. It had become a joint stock bank in 1865, switching
from traditional bill-broking business to facilitating long term credit and being involved
in railways, iron production, shipbuilding and others industries.19 During the spring of
1866, an action by Overend was pending in the courts to recover £60, 000. On May 9th
the court decided that Overend would not receive any compensation. The decision caused
a run upon Overend, and on the afternoon of May 10th the firm suspended payments with
17Tortella (1970, ch. 7).
18See Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999).
19Bagehot (1873).
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more than £18 millions of liabilities. The next day, May 11th, known as ‘Black Friday’,
Lombard Street witnessed a stock market collapse and a banking panic with crowds at
the gates of the most reputed banks.20
As occurred in 1847 and 1857, the Chancellor of the Exchequer authorized the sus-
pension of the Bank Charter Act of 1844 that prevented a strict support of gold, at cent
per cent, for the quantity of money at circulation. The temporary suspension of the Bank
Charter Act allowed the Bank to facilitate paper money without restriction, even with
more severe conditions for credit advances. On Saturday 12th, the Bank of England was
authorized to supply additional £4 millions not covered by gold reserves at a rate of dis-
count of 10 per cent. English policy-makers, at least some of them, were conscious of the
nature of the crisis and of how only by providing extra liquidity it could be averted by
the Bank of England.21
The rate of ten per cent at the Bank of England was maintained from May 11th to
August 6th. Although distrust in the English banking system lasted for a period of time,
there were no doubts about the solvency of the Bank of England, whose bullion rose
from £12 millions to £19 in December 1866.22 Many more banks and companies went
bankrupt during this crisis. The result was a second wave of monetary tightening in 1866
that severely affected the already weak health of banks and firms, not only in England, but
also in continental Europe. In Italy, for example, the Government was forced to introduce
the corso forzoso on May 11th, which represented a suspension of the convertibility of the
lira into gold and an additional supply of 250 million lire by the Bank of Italy.23
The impact of the financial crisis of May 1866 was amplified in Spain due to some policy
mistakes. In the Spring of 1866, the Government had proposed an heterodox approach
to solve its financing problems. The idea was to receive a loan of 100 million pesetas
from an English bank syndicate leaded by Overend, Gurney and Co. in exchange for the
rights of banknote emission in the whole country, that is, the suppression of the Bank of
Spain and the rest of banks of issue and the creation of a new national bank of issue in
the hands of the English bankers. The directors of the Bank of Spain strongly opposed
the operation, which was aborted due to the failure of Overend. On May 11th, when the
news about the failure of Overend arrived, the panic extended to many Spanish cities,
especially Barcelona. On May 12th, the Catalana General de Crédito and the Crédito
Mobiliario Barcelonés, two sociedades de credito, suspended payments. After that, a
20“Panic, true panic came with unexpected speed and violence that day”, says Clapham (1944, pp.
261-266).
21See Patterson (1870) or Flandreau and Ugolini (2011).
22Conant (1896, p. 505).
23Kindleberger and Aliber (2005, p. 117).
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chain of bankruptcies extended through the country.
The passivity of the Spanish authorities contrasts with the English case, where the
Government and the Bank of England cooperated to minimize the crisis and provide
extra liquidity during the panic. The practice of providing extra liquidity at penalty rates
was not in accordance with the actual orthodox nancial theory. In fact, the Central
Bank´s role of lender of last resort was not respectable among theorists until Bagehot´s
Lombard Street, appeared in 1873. Notwithstanding, in England, the Bank Charter Act
had been already suspended during the 1847 and 1857 crisis. In these cases the Bank
of England acted as a lender of last resort even if it had no explicit mandate about it.24
In Spain, however, the Bank of Spain and the local banks of issue considered each other
as competitors, so they felt no motivation to help. Besides, without any determination
by the Government to suspend convertibility at a national level, any attempt to provide
liquidity would have been useless. The consequence was a severe collapse of the nancial
system in 1866 that amplicated the monetary shock by reducing the volume of banknotes
and deposits.
The consequence of the crisis was a collapse in the Spanish banking system that took
several years to repair. When the crisis was over, more than 40 per cent of the Spanish
nancial system had been o!cially liquidated. The Bank of Spain bought during that
period 238 million reales of gold and silver bullion, whereas the volume of banknotes did
not grow signicantly.
This period of deleveraging and reconstruction came to an end in 1874, when the
Government decided to award the Bank of Spain the monopoly of emission in the whole
country in exchange for a loan of 125 million pesetas. The rest of banks of issue were
given the possibility of either to merge with the Bank or to operate solely as commercial
banks. On March 19wk 1874, the Bank of Spain became the only bank of issue in Spain.
4 Monetary dynamics
The aim of this section is to analyze the evolution of monetary dynamics during the period
1856-1873. To this end, we have constructed a historical database with information about
aggregate monetary variables. The description of the database can be found in Appendix
B. Here, we rst describe the data about money supply and its components. Then, we use
24Collins (1992) analyzes the role of the Bank of England as a lender of last resort in the 1866 crisis
compared to the ones of 1857 and 1878. He concludes that the Bank of England acted as a de facto
lender of last resort. Not was until 1890 that this responsibility was entirely displayed, during the Baring
crisis, although it ever remained doubtful about possible contradictions between the maintenance of
gold standard and the function of lender of last resort. See also Bignon, Flandreau and Ugolini (2011),
McKinnon (1993) and Eichengreen (1996).
a standard New Keynesian model to quantify the impact of monetary policy on output
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and prices during the period.
4.1 Money Supply and Components
Table 3 and Figure 1 present the data about the evolution of money supply and its
components. We define money supply as the sum of the currency (banknotes and coins)
plus current accounts in the banks of issue minus the metallic reserves of the system of
banks of issue. Two features should be noticed. Firstly, metal coins were by far the
bulk of the monetary base. On average the volume of coins was 15 times larger than the
volume of banknotes. This is the most explicit evidence of the underdevelopment of the
Spanish financial system during the first half of the 19th century. Secondly, the evolution
of the money supply displays a contraction during the period 1856-1866 and a progressive
recovery from 1868 to 1873.
The outflow of currency in the period 1856-1866 was mainly due to the effects of
‘Gresham’s Law’. Market and mint ratios between gold and silver were different in Spain,
making silver coins cheaper and thus creating an incentive to export silver. The fall in
the market price of gold to silver was due to the gold discoveries in California in 1848 and
Australia in 1851. These discoveries increased tenfold world gold production.
In 1851, the Government had suspended gold coinage in an attempt to stop silver
outflows. The law did not succeed at stopping silver exports, but it aggravated the
reduction in the monetary base. The prohibition was ruled out in 1854 and silver prices
were corrected to more sensible levels. However, the continuous rise of silver prices in the
world markets made it necessary to reform again the Spanish currency system in 1861 and
1864. These reforms realigned silver and gold prices and rationalized a complex system
of coinage.25 The 1864 currency reform temporarily solved these problems by modifying
the metallic content of silver coins and hence devaluing their metallic value in relation to
their face value. The new mint ratio was set to 15.48, higher than the London market
one, 15.37.
In 1865 the Latin Monetary Union was established. This was similar to a currency
area between European bimetallic countries. The initial members were France, Belgium,
Swiss and Italy, with Greece joining later in 1868. It established a mint ratio of 15.5 with
free circulation of gold coins and restricted circulation of silver coins. The desire to align
the Spanish coinage with the Latin Monetary Union explains why in 1868 a new currency
reform was published, introducing a new monetary unit, the peseta, and realigning the
mint ratio to 15.5.26 According to the data, during the period 1856-1866, more than 900
25See Sardà (1948, pp. 139-140).
26One peseta, at this time, had a value very close to that of the French franc. Although existing
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million pesetas left the country.
The net flow of currency can be decomposed in three components, as shown in Table 4
and Figure 2. In the first place, the large trade deficit, which peaked in 1863. Part of this
trade deficit was a consequence of the massive import of materials for the construction of
the new railways. In the second place, the large amounts of foreign capital that entered the
country to be invested in railways. This capital came mainly from France and Belgium,
as the English capital market was closed to Spain since the debt restructuring of Bravo
Murillo in 1851. In the third place, the payment of interests on public and private debt
and dividends on stocks. Before 1866, the outflow was larger as capital inflows were
not enough to compensate the trade deficit plus interests and dividends. The situation
reversed after 1867, due to the strong adjustment in the trade balance during the crisis
and to the large inflows of foreign capital to finance new emissions of public debt.
Figure 3 shows the evolution of banknotes and current accounts. During the boom
years, the volume of banknotes grew due to the emission by the new local banks and to
the relaxation in the ratio of banknotes over metallic reserves. When the crisis began
and due to the scarcity of metallic reserves, banks were forced to reduce the volume of
banknotes to minimize the risk of a bank-run on the banknotes. As shown in Figure 4,
the ratio of banknotes over metallic for the aggregate of local banks of issue was below
1.5. Some of them, such as the Bank of Barcelona operated with ratios of less than 1, that
is, all the banknotes were covered by specie (‘narrow banking’). This is a very low level
of emission, providing that the 1856 law entitled banks to emit banknotes in a volume of
less than three times the amount of their metallic reserves.
The Bank of Spain also contributed to the collapse in money and credit. To avoid
running out of reserves, the Bank of Spain began a tightening of its monetary policy and
raised interest rates to 9 percent at the end of 1864, keeping it at this level until the
end of 1866. It also tried to buy bullion in foreign markets. The result was an increase
in its reserves, which reached 27 million pesetas in 1865. Simultaneously, its volume of
banknotes fell from 71 million pesetas in 1864 to 61 in 1865 and then again to 44 in 1866.
The fall in current accounts was also dramatic, from 56 million pesetas in 1863 to 22
millions in 1866. The consequence was an abrupt decline in the ratio of banknotes over
metallic reserves in 1865 and 1866.
Finally, Table 5 and Figure 5 display the evolution of the Spanish exchange rate against
the British Pound and the French Franc. Exchange rates are in line with the evidence
about metallic flows. From 1856 to 1868, Spain experienced a steady outflow of specie,
from the beginning of the nineteenth century, the peseta only was the first Spanish monetary sign after
1868. Previously, the real — one quarter of the nominal peseta - was the Spanish monetary basis. See
Martin-Aceña (2000, pp. 112-151) and Fernandez-Pulgar and Anes-Alvarez (1970).
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which generated a depreciation of the Spanish Real against the Pound and the Franc.27
From 1869 onwards, capital and trade inflows surpassed the outflows, which produced
an appreciation of the currency, albeit quite volatile due to the turbulent political and
economic situation at the time.
4.2 The effects of monetary fluctuations
In this subsection we use the dataset to quantify the impact of the fluctuations in the
money supply in the observed evolution of output and prices. To this end, we compare
the counterfactual results from a calibrated new Keynesian DSGE model that replicated
the evolution in the money supply with the data in the 1856-1873 period.28 We choose the
new Keynesian model as it represents the current benchmark in the analysis of monetary
economics. We consider a very stylized framework, as in Gali (2009, Ch. 3) or Woodford
(2003, Ch. 3), that includes an IS equation, a forward-looking Phillips curve and a LM
equation. It describes a simple monetary economy, which appears appropriate to represent
a newborn monetary system as that of Spain in 1856-1973. Appendix A provides a
complete description of the model.
Our specification is such that, by log-linearizing the first order conditions of the house-
hold and the firm problems around a zero inflation steady state, it is possible to derive
the complete system of forward-looking equations. The IS relationship is given by
yt = Etyt+1 − [it − Etπt+1] (1)
where yt represents the percentage deviation of output from its long-run trend, it is the
nominal interest rate and πt is the inflation rate. The Phillips curve is given by
πt = βEtπt+1 + κyt, (2)
where κ = (ϕ+1)(1−θ)(1−βθ)θ is the slope of the Phillips curve, ϕ is the inverse of the Frisch
elasticity of labor supply, β is the subjective discount factor of households and θ is the
proportion of firms allowed to change price in each period.
The LM equation relates real money balances with nominal interest rates:
yt −
β
1− β it = lt, (3)
where lt ≡ mt − pt are real money balances. Finally, the law of motion of real money
balances is
lt = lt−1 − πt +Δmt, (4)
27A Real was equivalent to a 1/4 Pesetas.
28Data for GDP and Inflation are from Prados de la Escosura (2003). Data for the nominal interest
rate are from Tedde (2011).
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 25 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1119
where Δmt ≡ logMt − logMt−1 is the money growth rate of the money supply.
A common assumption in the new Keynesian literature is that monetary policy is
conducted by adjusting the nominal interest rate. However, this description does not
seem to fit with the Spanish experience of the 1850s and 1860s, during which the nominal
rate responded endogenously to changes in the metallic reserves of the banks of issue.
For this reason, we consider instead that the evolution of the money supply followed an
exogenous path given by
Δmt = ρmΔmt−1 + εmt, (5)
where εmt
i.i.d.∼ N(0,σ2m). This modelling strategy intends to reflect the exogenous changes
in the money supply due to the inflows and outflows of specie and to the issuing decisions
of a multiplicity of independent banks.
The model composed of (1), (2), (3) and (4) is a rational expectations linear system
in yt πt, it, lt and Δmt, which can be solved using standard techniques.29 We ignore
technology and preference shocks to focus solely on the impact of monetary shocks.
The calibration of the model is as follows. First, as the average inflation rate during
the period 1856-1873 is zero, we assume inflation to be zero in the steady-state of the
model. Next, we set the subjective discount factor β to 0.96 to match a nominal interest
rate of 6% in the steady state, which is the average value during the period 1856-1873. We
estimate the money supply process (5) by OLS and obtain ρm = 0.56 and σm = 0.07. We
are not able to directly estimate from the data the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor
supply ϕ and the frequency of price adjustment θ. Thus, we set ϕ = 1 as in Christiano,
Eichembaum and Evans (2005) and consider a value of θ = 0.75, which implies an average
frequency of price adjustments of one year, a common assumption in the new Keynesian
literature that seems plausible for the period.
Figure 6 compares the model results with the data. In particular, we estimate a
sequence of shocks to money supply growth such that the money supply predicted by the
model matches exactly the actual money supply observed in the data (see bottom right
panel). Figure 6 also displays the performance of output, inflation and the interest rate in
the data and in the model. In the data, there is a large drop in money growth between 1860
and 1866. In the model, this drop in the money supply implies large deflationary effects,
which produce a fall of around 30% in output and around 10% in inflation. Strikingly, this
prediction is in contrast with the data, that show that output and inflation were roughly
constant during the 1860-1865 period.30 Also, the recovery of money growth occurred in
29See, for example, Blanchard-Kahn (1980).
30We also consider the inflation data from Sardà (1998), based on agricultural commodities and from
Maluquer de Motes (2006), based on prices at the Boqueria market in Barcelona. These series do not
display any significant deflationary pressure between 1861 and 1865. However, it is important to notice
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1867 appears to have a delayed effect in the data of output and inflation with respect to
the model.31
In Table 6 we report volatility statistics in the data and in the model. Given that
we cannot estimate the frequency of price adjustment from the data, we consider three
scenarios for the parameter θ: 0.50, 0.75 and 0.85. In the first case, prices are changed
on average every six months. Although the volatility of output in the model is very close
to that in the data, 6% versus 7%, inflation volatility is significantly larger in the model,
10.2% versus 4.3%. The large inflation volatility is due to the high frequency of price
adjustment assumed. By increasing the value of θ, the volatility of output increases while
that of inflation declines. With a value θ = 0.75, for which the average duration of a price
is one year, both inflation and output in the model display a larger volatility in the model
with respect to the data, 7.1% and 13.1%, respectively. Finally, for an average duration
of roughly one year and a half, θ = 0.85, the volatility of inflation is close to that in the
data, 5.8% versus 4.3%, but output volatility becomes very large, 17.7%. In this case the
small frequency of price adjustment implies that monetary shocks have a large impact on
output. In all cases, the volatility of the nominal interest rate is 0.6%.
We conclude that monetary shocks did not affect the economy as predicted by this
stylized new Keynesian model. Nevertheless, it does not imply that new Keynesian theory
cannot account for the observed evolution of variables in the period. It is possible that the
Spanish economy was affected by a productivity shock that partially offset the effects of
the money contraction. It is however difficult to identify this technological breakthrough
in the Spanish economy of the 1860s. Another explanation is that the credit creation by
the sociedades de credito could have partially compensated the outflow of spice. Unfor-
tunately, we have not been able of collecting data on credit creation by these financial
agents. Finally, it is also possible that more complex models might describe better the
evolution of macroeconomic aggregates. In particular, the introduction of distortions à la
Christiano, Eichembaum and Evans (2005) could help to explain the delay in the response
to the monetary shock.32 We leave all these open questions for future research.
the divergences in the data for this period.
31Note that, as discussed in Galì (2008), the new Keynesian model with exogenous money supply does
not display the standard liquidity effect usually observed in the data after a monetary shock. Thus, a
decline in the money supply in the model implies a slight decline in the nominal interest rate.
32In addition, a small open-economy monetary model à la Gali and Monacelli (2005) might help to
explain the large trade flows at that time and their impact on the economy.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper we described the main characteristics of the historical context in which the
Bank of Spain was created. In particular, we focus on the multiplicity of banks that were
entitled to emit banknotes during the period 1856-1874. In this context, the Bank of
Spain was only the largest issuer of banknotes in the country. This system was successful
in expanding the volume of paper money during the expansion period, 1856-1864, but
it also amplified the contraction during the 1864-1868 crisis. In particular, the lack of
a lender of last resort might explain why the banking panic was so severe in Spain, in
contrast to England, where the Bank of England acted as a de facto lender of last resort
and convertibility was temporarily suspended. This paper also quantifies the economic
effects of the monetary fluctuations. We find the puzzle that, despite the fact that the
contraction of the money supply began in the early 1860s, the recession and deflation
were delayed until 1868, in contrast to what is predicted by new Keynesian theory.
In addition, this paper contributes to the literature analyzing free banking systems.
The Spanish monetary system during the period 1856-1874 shares many similarities with
other historical episodes where a multiplicity of private banks had the right to emit ban-
knotes. The year 1874 marks the transition from this type of system to a more standard
one, with a single issuer of banknotes. This natural experiment can be analyzed in future
research to understand the effects of a such a transition on the aggregate economy.
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6 Appendix A: The New Keynesian Model
In this appendix we described the model that we use for the empirical analysis of section
4.3.
6.1 The household problem
The intertemporal maximization problem of the household is
max
Ct,Bt,Mt,Nt
E0

∞
t=0βt

log(Ct) + γ log

Mt
Pt

− χN
1+ϕ
t
1 + ϕ
	
(6)
subject to
PtCt +Mt +QtBt = WtNt +Mt−1 +Bt−1 + PtΠt,
where η, ϕ, γ, χ are all positive parameters, Ct is consumption,Mt/Pt real money balances,
Nt labor, Bt bond holdings, Pt the price of the consumption good, Wt the real wage and
Qt is the nominal price of bonds. Finally, PtΠt are nominal profits from the ownership of
firms.
The first order conditions for this problem are summarized by the following three
conditions
1 = Et

βCtPt
Ct+1Pt+1
1
Qt

, (7)
γ

Mt
Pt
−1
= Ct(1−Qt), (8)
χNϕt
Ct
=
Wt
Pt
. (9)
The consumption index of the household is given by
Ct =
 1
0
C
−1

jt dj
 
−1
, (10)
where  > 1 represents the elasticity of substitution among differentiated goods, and the
corresponding price index is Pt =
 1
0
P 1−jt dj
 1
1−
. It follows that the demand function for
good j is
Cjt =

Pjt
Pt
−
Ct.
The firm problem
All firms j ∈ [0, 1] produce a differentiated good using the same constant returns to scale
technology with labor as the only input
Yjt = ANjt. (11)
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Each period a fraction θ of randomly chosen firms in the economy is not allowed to
change the price while the remaining 1 − θ will set prices optimally. The problem of a
firm allowed to change prices at time t is
max
pjt
Et

∞
k=0θjΔt,t+k

pjt
Pt+k
−MCt+k

Yjt+k, (12)
where Δt,t+k = βk

Ct+k
Ct
−1
is the stochastic discount factor from t+k to t andMCt+k =
Wt+k
Pt+kA
is the marginal cost.
Equilibrium and Money Supply
Market clearing in the goods market requires
Yjt = Cjt, (13)
and market clearing in the labor market requires
Nt =
 1
0
Njtdj. (14)
We consider an exogenous path for the growth rate of the money supply Δmt ≡
logMt − logMt−1.33 The process for the money growth rate is given by
Δmt = ρmΔmt−1 + εmt, (15)
where εmt
i.i.d.∼ N(0,σ2m). The evolution of nominal interest rates it ≡ − log(Qt) is given
by equation (8).
Appendix B: Sources and Methodology
Table 3
Data on the Net Flow of Money is described below (Table 4). Data on Banknotes, Current
Accounts and Metallic Reserves by Banks of Issue is taken from Tortella (1970). Finally,
the data on Money Supply is constructed by combining the information on banknotes
and current accounts with the amount of metallic coins. Metallic coins are constructed
backwards by taking as given the volume of coins in 1874 and using the Net Flow of
Money. Data about the metallic composition of the money supply is offered by Anes-
Alvarez (1974).
33Gali (2008) carefully describes this approach and analyzes the stability properties of new Keynesian
models with exogenous money supply.
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Table 4
Data on the Balance of Trade of Spain, 1856-1874, are directly taken from Prados de la
Escosura (2003).
Data on Net Entries of Foreign Capital are taken from several sources. For data about
railway investments, we have consulted: Broder (1976,1981) and Tedde (1978, pp. 9-354).
For banking investments, data have been collected from Sánchez-Albornoz (1977), Tortella
(1973), Broder (1976) and Tedde (1974). The information about mining and metallurgy
foreign investments come, for the British sources, from Stone (1999) and Harvey and
Taylor (1987). The French and Belgian data are drawn from Broder (1976,1981) and
from Chastagnaret (2000). We also have consulted Tortella (2008).The foreign investment
data of public utilities, like light and water urban services, come from Stone (1999) and
Costa-Campí (1982). For new issues of Public Debt along the period 1868-1874 data are
taken from Martín-Niño (1973).
Finally, data on Foreign Capital Interests and Benefits, Repayments and Interests of
Public Bonds and Transfers also come from several sources and we have applied for its
completion some conjectures. So, we have supposed that the recurrent repayment of Pub-
lic Debt was made by the buying of bonds by the Spanish Treasury, in the Stock Market,
at current prices. This hypothesis is backed by some specialists in Spain’s Financial His-
tory, as Artola (1986) and Comín (1988). Also, we have supposed that the profitability
of all the three private Banks in the form of Credit Mobilier that were created by French
initiative at the middle of the 19th Century was the same of the Sociedad de Crédito Mo-
biliario Español, of which we have some data from Sánchez-Albornoz (1977). Similarly,
we have speculated with equal dividends of railways companies, along this period, in term
of percentage on capital share, to those paid off by the two major of them, the Compañía
de Caminos de Hierro del Norte de España and Madrid-Zaragoza-Alicante; this last in-
formation is contained in Tedde (1978). For mining and metallurgy profitability, we have
taken the relative information from Harvey and Taylor (1987), which cointains averages
of dividend and interest payments for British investments. We have assumed that it can
be acceptable to apply this rate of return to the French and Belgian investments in the
same industry. For the public utilities investments we have applied the same real rate of
return resulting from public bonds. Transfers data are directly taken form Prados de la
Escosura (2010).
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Table 1. Number of Banks and Sociedades de Credito
Banks of issue Sociedades de Credito Total
1856 4 6 13
1857 10 6 19
1858 10 7 20
1859 10 7 20
1860 11 8 22
1861 11 12 26
1862 12 17 32
1863 14 20 37
1864 21 34 57
1865 21 35 58
1866 21 32 54
1867 21 26 47
1868 20 21 41
1869 19 14 33
1870 16 14 30
1871 16 14 30
1872 16 14 30
1873 16 14 30
Source: Tortella, (1973, p. 9).
Appendix C: Tables and Figures
Table 2. Capital invested in joint stock companies by sector (million pesetas)
Manufacturing Sociedades de Credito Railways
1859 99.8 93.3 943.9
1861 96.0 105.1 517.4
1864 98.4 242.7 654.8
1866 66.5 229.2 698.9
Source: Tortella (1973, p. 170).
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Table 3. Money creation and money supply
Net flow of money Banknotes Current accounts (-) Reserves Money supply
BoS Rest Total BoS Rest Total BoS Rest Total
1856 20.5 39.7 17.3 57.0 41.1 15.4 56.5 36.3 12.0 48.3 2,129
1857 -23.8 45.7 25.8 71.6 33.8 17.0 50.7 27.1 18.2 45.3 2,117
1858 -165.5 52.0 34.0 86.0 45.1 18.3 63.5 29.2 21.4 50.6 1,973
1859 -10.7 66.9 45.4 112.3 57.3 25.1 82.5 30.8 34.0 64.8 1,993
1860 -7.4 63.5 54.7 118.2 43.3 25.9 69.2 23.1 29.9 53.0 1,991
1861 -34.5 44.9 55.1 100.0 35.7 17.8 53.6 23.6 24.1 47.6 1,928
1862 -94.2 52.1 47.9 100.0 54.6 17.8 72.4 29.0 22.8 51.8 1,848
1863 -159.2 68.3 49.3 117.6 56.8 19.4 76.3 31.0 24.4 55.5 1,707
1864 -141.8 71.8 53.0 124.8 22.1 16.0 38.1 19.7 25.3 45.0 1,544
1865 -199.6 61.9 52.8 114.7 22.2 21.2 43.4 27.4 27.2 54.5 1,330
1866 -129.4 44.6 45.2 89.8 18.0 29.3 47.3 21.6 42.5 64.0 1,170
1867 14.4 49.4 46.0 95.4 47.4 33.3 80.7 29.5 40.6 70.1 1,218
1868 -41.7 55.1 47.8 102.9 28.8 29.5 58.2 20.6 38.1 58.7 1,173
1869 224.4 53.1 42.9 96.0 40.6 36.1 76.7 26.1 53.1 79.1 1,388
1870 157.4 61.1 38.0 99.1 78.3 41.7 120.0 73.1 65.7 138.8 1,532
1871 81.6 79.6 42.6 122.2 75.7 51.8 127.5 101.9 60.0 161.9 1,621
1872 147.2 68.1 46.6 114.8 62.5 50.5 113.0 54.0 73.2 127.2 1,781
1873 85.0 55.0 42.3 97.3 43.7 34.9 78.6 31.8 42.0 73.8 1,868
‘BoS’ refers to the Bank of Spain, ‘Rest’ is the rest of the banking system. All units are in million pesetas.
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Table 4. Net flow of money 1856-1873
Balance of trade Net entries of foreign capital Net interests, dividends and transfers Total
Exports (-) Imports Total Railways Mining Banking Public Debt Other Total Public Private Transfers Total
1856 343.7 348.9 -5.2 15.8 0.5 54.7 0 0 71.0 -51.4 -1.0 7.1 -45.3 20.5
1857 358.8 413.5 -54.7 78.3 0.5 1.8 0 0 80.6 -55.2 -2.5 8.0 -49.7 -23.8
1858 222.8 415.2 -192.4 81.6 0.4 1.0 0 0 83.0 -48.5 -15.6 8.0 -56.1 -165.5
1859 262.5 346.5 -84.0 127.4 0.6 8.2 0 0 136.2 -49.3 -22.0 8.4 -62.9 -10.7
1860 333.0 360.7 -27.7 91.6 0.4 1.8 0 0 93.8 -45.8 -36.3 8.6 -73.5 -7.4
1861 339.4 377.5 -38.1 59.9 3.7 17.1 0 0 80.7 -49.9 -35.8 8.6 -77.1 -34.5
1862 265.9 420.1 -154.2 121.4 6.5 5.7 0 0 133.6 -37.6 -45.9 9.9 -73.6 -94.2
1863 316.6 514.3 -197.7 86.3 6.4 45.6 0 0 138.3 -55.8 -53.5 9.5 -99.8 -159.2
1864 352.6 503.3 -150.7 65.6 6.6 22.8 0 0 95.0 -33.3 -62.6 9.8 -86.1 -141.8
1865 282.9 442.0 -159.1 25.5 6.5 0 0 0 32.0 -34.7 -48.3 10.5 -72.5 -199.6
1866 315.7 439.9 -124.2 41.8 6.4 0 0 0 48.2 -32.3 -33.8 12.7 -53.4 -129.4
1867 398.0 348.4 49.6 10.3 6.6 0 0 0 16.9 -31.1 -34.4 13.4 -52.1 14.4
1868 411.8 408.7 3.1 10.0 6.5 0 0 0 16.5 -40.9 -35.0 14.6 -61.3 -41.7
1869 454.8 357.3 97.5 45.9 6.4 0 171.4 0 223.7 -74.2 -39.5 16.9 -96.8 224.4
1870 357.5 375.7 -18.2 23.1 6.6 0 250.0 0 279.7 -74.2 -47.2 17.3 -104.1 157.4
1871 470.8 440.7 30.1 5.7 6.5 0 152.3 8.4 164.5 -74.2 -55.7 16.9 -113.0 81.6
1872 525.3 547.6 -22.3 3.0 23.8 0 236.3 7.4 271.5 -59.5 -64.6 22.1 -102.0 147.2
1873 618.1 462.4 155.7 2.7 23.7 8.7 0 4.3 42.5 -76.9 -64.3 28.0 -113.2 85.0
‘Mining’ includes investments in mining and metallurgy. All units are in million pesetas.
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Table 5. Rates of Exchange of the Spanish Real, 1856-1874
(Spanish Reales by British Sterling Pound and French Franc)
Sterling Pound French Franc
1856 93.93 3.77
1857 96.11 3.88
1858 94.77 3.79
1859 96.15 3.8
1860 95.26 3.8
1861 96.77 3.84
1862 95.63 3.83
1863 96.78 3.89
1864 96.8 3.85
1865 98.005 3.935
1866 98.93 3.935
1867 97.86 3.9
1868 98.82 3.94
1869 96.48 3.87
1870 96.03 3.54
1871 97.96 3.81
1872 99.23 3.86
1873 94.6 3.79
Source: Years 1850-1855: Tedde (1999); Years 1856-1874: Banco de España,
Memoria(s) and Archivo del Banco de España, Books 1426 to 1451.
Table 6. Volatility statistics
% Data Model
θ = 0.50 θ = 0.75 θ = 0.83
yt 7.0 6.0 13.1 17.7
πt 4.3 10.2 7.1 5.8
it 1.3 0.6 0.6 0.6
Δmt 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5
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Figure 2: Net flow of money
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 39 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1119
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
1856 1857 1858 1859 1860 1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 1866 1867 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873
'0
00
 p
ts
Banknotes-Local Banks Banknotes-Bank of Spain Current Accounts-Local Banks Current Accounts-Bank of Spain
Figure 3: Volume of banknotes and current accounts
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
1856 1857 1858 1859 1860 1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 1866 1867 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873
Local Banks Bank of Spain Total
Figure 4: Ratio of banknotes / metallic
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 40 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1119
Figure 5: Rates of Exchange of the Spanish Real, 1856-1874 (Spanish Reales by British
Sterling Pound and French Franc)
Figure 6: Comparison between model and data. θ = 0.75.
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